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A Survey of Contribution:
Equal or Fault-Based Shares?
INTRODUCTION
Under the common law, there is no right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors. 1 Joint tortfeasors are jointly and sever-
ally liable for the plaintiffs injury, and the plaintiff may execute
the entire judgment, or any part of it, against any of the defend-
ants.2 The tortfeasor who pays more than his proportionate
share of the obligation cannot force his co-tortfeasors to contri-
bute.3 Thus, one tortfeasor can be made to bear the entire burden
of an injury caused by several. The policy behind the no-contribu-
tion rule is that courts should not aid a wrongdoer whose cause
of action is predicated upon his own illegal or immoral act.4
Yet in a judicial system where liability is based on fault, it
appears unjust that one tortfeasor should be required to pay for
1. E.g., Parker v. Mauldin, 353 So. 2d 1375 (Ala. 1977); National Trailer Convoy, Inc.
v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967); Burmeister v. Youngstrom, 81
S.D. 578, 139 N.W.2d 226 (1965). These cases represent only a small fraction of the
numerous decisions following the traditional rule. Its origin is usually traced to the Eng-
lish case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), in
which contribution was denied between two intentional tortfeasors. Originally, the term
joint tortfeasors referred only to those wrongdoers who acted intentionally and in concert
to cause an injury. Now it embraces negligent tortfeasors acting independently as well.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 291-93 (4th ed. 1971). The Amer-
ican jurisdictions following the common law rule originally applied it only in cases
involving intentional tortfeasors. As joinder rules became more liberal and negligent
wrongdoers were joined in a single action, however, the courts denied contribution among
negligent tortfeasors, too. For a historical discussion of the development of this rule in
the United States, see Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958). See also Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
2. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 46, at 291-92. Joint and several liability means the
plaintiff can sue any or all of the possible defendants who caused the injury.
3. Id. at 305. A tortfeasor is also denied contribution from a party the plaintiff decides
not to sue. At common law, the plaintiff was considered "lord of his action" and could
place the burden where he saw fit. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 1939
Act, 9 U.L.A. 230, 230-32 (1955) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note). [hereinafter cited as
1939 Act].
4. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 451, 104 A. 815, 816 (1918). Additionally,
courts are reluctant to waste judicial time and energy by apportioning damages among
defendants. Avery v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 221 Mo. 71, 119 S.W. 1106 (1909);
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Chapman, 167 Or. 661,664-65, 120 P.2d 223, 224 (1941).
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more than his fair share of the plaintiffs injury.5 In modern tort
law, fault does not necessarily imply moral blame, but often
merely signifies conduct that falls below a prescribed standard
of care.6 Thus, the policy supporting the common law rule, while
applicable to an intentional tortfeasor whose acts are illegal and
immoral, is inappropriate to the negligent or strictly liable
defendant of today.7
At one time, most American jurisdictions followed the tradi-
tional rule. Increased recognition of the many inequities asso-
ciated with the rule, however, led a large majority of states to
either abolish or modify the no-contribution rule and permit con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors8 Most states effected this
reform through legislation, but a significant number of states
altered the no-contribution rule by judicial decision.9
5. Prosser stated this inequity as follows:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire
burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally
responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a suc-
cessful levy of execution, the evidence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim
or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoers, while the latter goes scot
free.
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 307.
6. Id. § 75, at 492-94.
7. See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 1955 Revised Act, 12 U.L.A. 57
(1975) (Commissioners' Comment § 1), [hereinafter cited as Revised Act].
8. See, e.g., Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1170 (1941); James, Replication, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1178 (1941); Gregory, Rejoinder, 54
HARV. L REV. 1184 (1941).
9. At the present time, 39 states permit contribution among joint tortfeasors by sta-
tute: ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-09.16.060 (1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009
(1962); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-101 to 13-
50.5-106 (Supp. 1980); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31
(West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-32 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to 663-17
(1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to 6-806 (1979); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301-305 (1981); KY.
REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1972); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2103 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231-B, §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law. Coop.
1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600-292 5a-600.292 5d (1968 & Supp. 1982-1983); MINN.
STAT. § 604.02 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon
1953); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 17.225-17.305 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507:7a-507:7b (Supp. 1979); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-1 to 53A-5 (1952);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to 41-3-8 (1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney
1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-1 to 1B-6 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to 32-38-04
(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West
Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.430-18.510 (1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§§ 8321-8327 (Purdon Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11 (1969 & Supp. 1980);
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to 15-8-22 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-11-101 to 29-11-
106 (1980); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-39 to
78-27-43 (1953); VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.040-4.22.920
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Contribution permits a tortfeasor who has paid more than his
share of the common liability to recover from the other tortfea-
sors the amount paid in excess of that share.10 Each tortfeasor's
share is computed either on a numerical or relative basis. Where
the determination is numerical, the total amount of damages is
divided by the number of tortfeasors, with each tortfeasor's
share of liability being equal." When the determination is made
on a relative basis, the shares are computed acording to the per-
centage of causal fault attributable to each wrongdoer. 12 Thus,
the shares are unequal, unless all are equally at fault. In either
case, the right to contribution does not arise until one pays more
than his share of the total liability.13
This article will survey the types of contribution statutes in the
United States, focusing on whether they provide for distribution
of liability among tortfeasors on a numerical or relative basis. It
will also examine distribution in the states that allow contribu-
tion without a statute. The recent direction of contribution law is
toward relative-fault liability.14 This article will consider the
effect comparative negligence has had on this trend. The article
will then analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each type of
distribution and conclude that relative-fault distribution of liabil-
(Supp. 1983-84) W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1981); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to 1-1-113 (1977). In
many of these states, the no-contribution rule was altered initially by a court decision,
with the statute enacted subsequently.
Five states recognize contribution by judicial decision. These states and the decisions
in which the common law rule was abolished are: Iowa-Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77
N.W.2d 23 (1956); Kansas-Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980);
Maine-Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Nebraska-Royal Indem. Co.
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975); Wisconsin-Ellis v.
Chicago & N.W. R.R., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). In addition, the District of
Columbia changed the common law rule in George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co.,
126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Six states still follow the common law rule, with some judicial exceptions. These states
are: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, South Carolina and Vermont.
10. Revised Act, supra note 7, § 1.
11. For example, if there are two responsible tortfeasors, each one's share is 50% of the
total damages. If there are three tortfeasors, then the share of each is 33 1/3%.
12. Thus, when the trier of fact finds a tortfeasor has caused 80% of the total injury to
the plaintiff, that tortfeasor's share is 80%, and he has no right to enforce contribution
until he pays at least 80% of the judgment. On the other hand, in a jurisdiction that
computes shares under a numerical rule, he would only be responsible for 50% of the
judgment (if there were two tortfeasors).
13. See Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
14. Of the 19 contribution statutes passed or amended since 1970, 15 specifically state
that each tortfeasor's share is based on relative-fault considerations.
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ity between joint tortfeasors is the more equitable system. 15
THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION ACTS
Many state contribution statutes are patterned after the 1939
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act' 6 (1939 Act) or
the 1955 Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act' 7
(Revised Act). The drafters of these uniform acts attempted to
create a model for state legislatures and thereby foster uniform-
ity among the growing number of states considering contribu-
tion laws.18 To a degree, this goal has been achieved; 19 however,
there is variance between the two Acts and thus among the
states as to the type of share determination used in computing a
tortfeasor's share of total liability. The earlier version permits
the finder of fact to consider the relative degrees of fault in
determining tortfeasors' shares of liability.20 On the other hand,
the Revised Act states that relative degrees of fault are not to be
taken into account. 21 The revision reflected an apparent reluc-
tance to adopt a relative-fault rule.22 That revision may have
been premature, however, because recently most states have
15. A numerical distribution is often referred to as a pro rata apportionment. See, e.g.,
Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 728 (1967).
Thus, the term "pro rata shares" is often used synonymously with equal shares. Many of
the recent contribution statutes, however, provide for relative-fault shares and still use
the term "pro rata shares" to describe the apportionment. An example is the Illinois
contribution act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301-305 (1981). Therefore, the term "pro rata
share" can generate confusion. To avoid this confusion, whenever "pro rata share" is
used in this article, it will refer to a tortfeasor's share in the total liability, whether that
share is determined numerically or relatively.
16. 1939 Act, supra note 3, at 230.
17. Revised Act, supra note 7.
18. 1939 Act, supra note 3, Commissioners' Prefatory Note at 231; Revised Act supra
note 7, Commissioners' Prefatory Note at 59-60.
19. For example, settlement and release procedures in contribution statutes are fairly
uniform now.
20. The 1939 Act provides in pertinent part: "When there is such a disproportion of
fault among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them
of the common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tort-
feasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares." 1939 Act, supra note 3,
§ 2(4), at 235.
21. The 1955 Act states: "In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the
entire liability (a) their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered; (b) if equity
requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share; and (c)
principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply." Revised Act, supra
note 7, § 2, at 87.
22. See infra note 28.
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rejected the new version and instead have adopted relative-fault
provisions similar to the 1939 Act.23
The drafters of the 1939 Act strongly urged states to adopt the
Act with the relative-fault provision included. They argued that
great injustice would result if a more culpable tortfeasor were
able to shift half of the burden onto a less culpable wrongdoer.
To the drafters, this inequity was unacceptable. The drafters empha-
sized that a plaintiffs rights would be unaffected by the relative-
fault provision because each defendant would remain jointly and
severally liable for the plaintiffs injury.24
According to the provisions of the 1939 Act, relative degrees of
fault were to be considered only when there was such dispropor-
tionate fault so as to make equal distribution inequitable.25
Therefore, if the court decided that fault apportionment was not
necessary to prevent inequity, shares of liability would be divided
equally. If the evidence did indicate disproportionate fault, the
court would then instruct the jury that a verdict for the plaintiff
would require it to determine the relative fault of each defend-
ant.26 To insure fairness to all the parties, a further provision
required that the issue of proportionate fault actually be litigated
before the relative-fault rule could operate.27
By 1955, it was apparent that the 1939 Act had not achieved
its goal of uniformity. Few of the states which had enacted con-
tribution laws had included relative-fault provisions in their stat-
utes. 28 Consequently, in revising the Act, the drafters amended
the model statute to provide that relative degrees of fault would
not be considered in determining each tortfeasor's share of total
liability.29 In an additional change, the drafters amended the
1939 Act by denying contribution to intentional tortfeasors. 30
23. See supra note 14.
24. 1939 Act, supra note 3, Commissioners' Note at 236.
25. See supra note 20.
26. 1939 Act, supra note 3, Commissioners' Note at 237. If there is no jury, then the
court makes any necessary apportionment. Id. See also United States Fire Ins. Co. v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 246 Ark. 1269, 1277-79, 441 S.W.2d 787, 791 (1969).
27. 1939 Act, supra note 3, § 7(5), at 247.
28. Of the states adopting the 1939 Act only Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, and South
Dakota included the relative fault language.
29. See supra note 21.
30. The 1955 Act states: "There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor
who has intentionally [willfully or wantonly] caused or contributed to the injury or
wrongful death." Revised Act, supra note 7, § 1(c), at 63. The 1939 Act had been silent
with respect to intentional tortfeasors.
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These two changes were interrelated. Intentional tortfeasors
are likely to have a greater degree of fault than negligent tort-
feasors. 31 Thus, an equal-share contribution rule is often to their
advantage because they are responsible for less damage than
they cause. The 1939 Act did not adopt equal-share contribution
because of a reluctance to aid intentional tortfeasors in this
manner. By denying contribution to intentional wrongdoers, the
1955 Revised Act drafters were able to adopt equal sharing with-
out aiding intentional tortfeasors and eliminate the primary
argument in favor of relative fault.32 The Revised Act did not
eliminate the inequity which existed between negligent tort-
feasors whose respective degrees of fault varied widely, however.
Two other provisions of the 1955 Revised Act relate to the
determination of pro rata shares. First, section 2(b) provides that
"if equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group
shall constitute a single share."3 3 Thus, two or more tortfeasors
may, because of a special relation to each other, be counted as
one for purposes of determining the shares of liability. For
example, if a servant commits a tort for which he and his master
are liable along with a third defendant, equitable considerations
justify treating the master and servant as a single unit. The net
effect is to reduce the amount of their liability.34
The second provision, section 2(c), asserts that "principles of
equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply."35 One of
the purposes of this section is to remedy the problem that exists
when one tortfeasor is insolvent.36 It operates to increase the
31. See id. Commissioners' Comment § 3, at 87.
32. Id. The 1955 Revised Act resembles the common law rule of contribution as origi-
nally formulated in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.
1799). The Merryweather rule, like the Revised Act, denied contribution to intentional
tortfeasors, but allowed it for other wrongdoers. See supra note 1.
33. Revised Act, supra note 7, § 2(b), at 87.
34. Id. Commissioners' Comment § 3, at 87. The share of the master and servant
combined, applying this section, is 50%. If each were treated individually their shares
would total 66 2/3% (33 1/3% each). Besides vicarious relationships, the comment lists
co-owners of property, members of unincorporated associations, and those involved in
joint enterprises as others to whom this section applies.
35. Id. § 2(c), at 87.
36. Id. Commissioners' Comment § 3, at 87. This section is intended to operate as
follows: Assume A, B, and C cause an injury and C is insolvent. If A pays the entire
judgment, he normally could demand contribution in the amount of one-third each from
B and C. Since C is insolvent, however, A can get nothing from him. "Principles of
equity" will allow A to obtain contribution from B in the amount of one-half, instead of
one-third. If C ever becomes solvent, A and B each have a right to contribution from him.
[Vol. 14654
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shares of solvent tortfeasors by requiring them to take on the
shares of insolvent defendants. It is not intended to allow a court
to use "principles of equity" to apportion liability among defend-
ants on a relative fault basis.37
The survey which follows divides the states into four groups.
The first group consists of those states with contribution statutes
that follow the 1955 Act and specifically provide for numerical
shares. The second comprises those states which specifically
allow relative fault consideration. Within this group are two sub-
categories: states with statutes based on the 1939 Act and states
with statutes that depart from the 1939 Act. Third are those
states with contribution statutes which do not specify how liabil-
ity is to be apportioned. Fourth are the states which have
adopted contribution by judicial decision. The survey will then
examine the individual states within each group to determine
how the contribution shares are allocated and the respective
numerical or relative liability provisions interpreted.
TYPES OF CONTRIBUTION LAW
Equal-Share Statutes
Eight states have contribution statutes that specifically divide
joint tortfeasors' shares on a numerical basis.38 Generally, the
courts in these states follow the literal language of their respec-
tive statutes and divide liability equally without regard to fault.
The emergence of comparative negligence, however, has necessi-
tated a reevaluation of the policy of equal sharing. Of the eight
states with equal-share statutes, six also adopted comparative
Id. The drafters of the 1939 Act also recognized this "equity rule" for insolvent defend-
ants although they did not incorporate an actual provision in that Act. In a note, how-
ever, the Commissioners recommended the "equity rule" be followed. 1939 Act, supra note
3, Commissioners' Note at 235-36.
37. Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 430-31 (Alaska 1979); Revised
Act, supra note 7, Commissioners' Comment § 3, at 87.
38. The statutes in Alaska, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina and Tennessee
are similar to the 1955 Act. See supra note 21 for the relevant texts. Mississippi and
California have statutes that differ from the 1955 Act. The Mississippi statute provides in
pertinent part: "In any action for damages where judgment is rendered against two (2) or
more defendants, jointly and severally, as joint tortfeasors, the defendants against whom
such a judgment is rendered shall share equally the obligation imposed by such judg-
ment ...... MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972). The California statute states: "The pro rata
share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be determined by dividing the entire
judgment equally among all of them." CAL CIw. PRoc. ANN. § 876(a) (West 1980).
19831 655
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negligence, and four directly faced the issue of whether, in light
of comparative negligence, relative-fault contribution is now the
law.39
Comparative negligence and relative-fault contribution are simi-
lar doctrines. Under each, liability is distributed according to the
percentage of fault attributable to the respective parties. Com-
parative negligence apportions liability between plaintiffs and
defendants; relative-fault contribution applies only to defend-
ants. The goal of both doctrines is to apportion liability in the
most equitable manner possible.
Comparative negligence abolishes the all or nothing rule of
contributory negligence and allows a plaintiff to recover even
though partially at fault for his own injury.40 Criticism of the
contributory negligence rule had been as harsh as the criticism
directed at the rule denying contribution among tortfeasors,
primarily because the principal objections to each are the same:
that liability is not divided equitably according to fault. When
numerical share states adopted comparative negligence, the likely
question became what effect this development would have on
their contribution statutes.
One of the major arguments against relative-fault contribution
is that computing percentages of fault is too difficult a task for
either a court or a jury. The successful application of compara-
tive negligence has undermined this argument, however. For
example, in Mississippi, which adopted comparative negligence
by statute in 1910, the state courts allocate fault between plain-
tiffs and defendants but, because of the state contribution stat-
ute, do not apply relative-fault principles to determine liability
among defendants. 41 The Mississippi Supreme Court has empha-
sized the similarity between comparative negligence and relative-
fault contribution, stating that fault apportionment solely among
defendants poses no more of a problem for a jury than do com-
39. The states adopting comparative negligence are Alaska, California, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Mississippi and North Dakota. The courts in Alaska, California, Massa-
chusetts and North Dakota decided cases pitting comparative negligence against an
equal-share contribution statute. "
40. In contributory negligence jurisdictions, a plaintiff found negligent in contribut-
ing to his own injury is precluded from recovering anything at all from the defendant.
There are two types of comparative negligence. The pure form permits the plaintiff to
recover that part of the injury he did not cause, no matter how much he is at fault. The
modified form denies recovery to a plaintiff when he has caused 50% or more of his
injury.
41. See supra note 38 for the relevant text of the Mississippi contribution statute.
[Vol. 14
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parative negligence verdicts. 42 Nevertheless, the court upheld
equal liability in deference to the legislative policy as expressed
in the contribution statute.43 Thus, Mississippi maintains equal-
share distribution, although the state's supreme court recognizes
the merits of relative-fault liability.
Two federal courts in Michigan have concluded that the state
supreme court's adoption of comparative negligence amended by
implication the earlier contribution statute which provided for
equal shares.44 Both courts found that comparative negligence
rendered factfinders just as competent to allocate fault among
joint tortfeasors as between plaintiff and defendant.45 The Mich-
igan Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.
Massachusetts and Alaska also retain equal-share contribu-
tion despite the adoption of comparative negligence. Unlike
other courts which have favorably compared comparative negli-
gence to relative-fault contribution, the Massachusetts courts
have found that equal sharing sufficiently alleviated the unfair-
ness of the traditional no-contribution rule.46 The purpose of the
Massachusetts contribution statute, according to the state su-
preme court, is to achieve a more equitable distribution of the
burden between defendants.47 Apparently, in Massachusetts,
equal-share contribution is equitable enough.
The Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar result in Arctic
Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore.48 The party challenging the equal
share statute in Arctic Structures argued that the underlying
purpose of the statutes was the fair and equitable treatment of
multiple defendants. The challenger added that relative-fault
42. Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316 (Miss.
1977).
43. Id. at 1319.
44. Michigan adopted comparative negligence in Placek v. City of Sterling Heights,
405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
45. See Conkright v. Ballantyne of Omaha, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
Jorae v. Clinton Crop Serv., 465 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Both decisions were
limited to the products liability field, not addressing the issue of whether comparative
fault is applicable in all tort actions. Yet the courts appeared to suggest that it would be
applicable. No Michigan state court has come to a similar conclusion. A Michigan appel-
late court in Sexton v. American Aggregates, 60 Mich. App. 524, 231 N.W.2d 449 (1975),
found that relative-fault contribution is analogous to comparative negligence. Since the
contribution statute provided for equal shares, and comparative negligence had not yet
been adopted in Michigan, however, it decided not to adopt relative fault.
46. Graci v. Damon, 6 Mass. App. 160, 374 N.E.2d 311 (1978).
47. Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 375 Mass. 644, 648, 378 N.E.2d 442, 445 (1978).
48. 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).
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contribution was a more equitable means of apportionment than
equal shares and therefore more consistent with the underlying
legislative intent. In addition, the court's recent decision to adopt
comparative negligence proved that relative-fault contribution
was judicially acceptable as well.49 The supreme court rejected
this argument, holding that joint and several liability remained
intact and refusing to adopt relative fault.5 0 Although the court
discussed the joint and several liability issue in detail, it dis-
missed the relative fault argument with a short footnote.51
One justice in Arctic Structures concurred with the resolution
of the joint and several liability issue, but dissented from the
majority's decision to retain equal shares. He argued that, while
equal sharing furnished a rough approximation of justice and
was certainly preferable to the traditional no-contribution rule,
the better rule of apportionment was one based on relative fault.
He added that, since the adoption of comparative negligence, the
reasons supporting equal liability no longer existed and further
asserted that equal distribution was so arbitrary that its applica-
tion in certain instances might violate constitutional due process.52
Courts in California and North Dakota have held, in contrast,
that the adoption of comparative negligence effectively overruled
and amended their equal-share contribution statutes. 53 The Cali-
49. Id. at 431. Alaska adopted comparative negligence in Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037
(Alaska 1975).
50. Arctic Structures Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 431-35 (Alaska 1979).
51. The court merely concluded: "However, we have considered and reject judicial
creation of a partial indemnity rule of law, adopted by the California Supreme Court in
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 195, 578
P.2d 899, 912 (1978)." Id. at 435 n.27.
52. Arctic Structures, 605 P.2d at 440-44. The dissenter gave an example of a defend-
ant who is only 10% at fault for an injury, but yet may have to pay 50% of the damages.
The possible constitutional issue focuses on substantive due process. The test under
Alaskan law for a violation of substantive due process is whether the action is arbitrary
or whether there is a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The only
legitimate state purpose supporting equal distribution would seem to be simplicity. How-
ever, since the adoption of comparative negligence, simplicity no longer justifies the inequit-
able result when degrees of fault are not used. Id. at 441 n.1.
53. In North Dakota the contribution statute was originally enacted in order to elimi-
nate the need to assess the degree of fault between tortfeasors. Steuber v. Hastings Heat-
ing & Sheet Metal Co., 153 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (N.D. 1967). See also Sayler v. Holstrom,
239 N.W.2d 276, 282-83 (N.D. 1976). However, when the North Dakota legislature adopted
comparative negligence, the state supreme court, after attempting to reconcile the perti-
nent provisions of each statute, concluded the equal share section of the contribution
statute had been amended by implication. Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113,
121 (N.D. 1979).
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fornia contribution statute distributes liability equally among
tortfeasors 5 4 yet the California Supreme Court held that it did
not prohibit the development of common law comparative indem-
nity.55 Under this new partial indemnity rule, each tortfeasor's
liability is in direct proportion to his respective fault.56 In con-
cluding that the partial indemnity rule is workable, the Califor-
nia court pointed to the success of comparative negligence.5 7 The
court also stated that the rule did not conflict with the contribu-
tion statute because the legislative history of the statute demon-
strated that its purpose was to lessen the harshness and inequity
of the no-contribution rule.5 8 Allowing comparative indemnity
advanced this legislative purpose by further reducing the ineq-
uity of the no-contribution rule.59
Although four of the six states with both equal-share contribu-
tion statutes and comparative negligence have not altered their
statutes in favor of relative-fault contribution, the increasing
acceptance of comparative negligence in other states has had a
tremendous impact in these states. The success of comparative
54. See supra note 34. Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 551-52, 26 Cal. Rptr.
393, 398 (1962); Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1960).
At least one case has expressed doubt as to whether the statute requires an equal distri-
bution, offering the possibility that the pro rata share is only a ceiling on liability. See
Rollins v. State, 14 Cal. App. 3d 160, 165 n.8, 92 Cal. Rptr. 251, 254 n.8 (1971).
55. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
56. Id. at 599, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195, 578 P.2d at 912 (1978). Traditional indemnity is an
all or nothing proposition. If one defendant is entitled to indemnity, the entire loss shifts
onto another party, who, according to notions of equity and justice, ought to bear the
loss. It is an equitable doctrine. Rollins v. State, 14 Cal. App. 3d 160, 165, 92 Cal. Rptr.
251, 254-55 (1971). Indemnity was often used to remedy the inequity of the no-contribution
rule. For example, a tortfeasor guilty of passive negligence could obtain indemnity from a
tortfeasor who was actively negligent. A passively negligent tortfeasor is less at fault
than the active tortfeasor; therefore, equity entitles him to shift the entire burden on to a
more responsible party. See generally Note, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package
Co.: Adoption of Contribution in Illinois, 9 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 1015, 1017-18 (1978). Often-
times, however, indemnity did not produce an equitable allocation of a loss because par-
tial shifting of a loss is not allowed. American Motorcycle allowed partial indemnity
between two negligent defendants. A later case permitted partial indemnity between a
negligent defendant and a strictly liable defendant. The allocation of fault becomes much
more difficult when there is a strictly liable tortfeasor who is liable without fault. Safe-
way Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441,146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
57. Comparative negligence became law in California in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
58. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 599-603, 578 P.2d at 912-15, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
195-99 (1978); Safeway v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 328-29, 579 P.2d 441, 447-48, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 556-57 (1978).
59. Id.-
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negligence has convinced many courts that relative fault is a
workable rule. These courts have conceded that relative fault is
more equitable than equal sharing but have deferred to the legis-
lature to make the change. It is possible that the legislatures in
these states may soon follow the lead of the judiciary. 60
Relative-Fault Statutes
There are presently twenty states with contribution statutes
providing for relative-fault contribution. 61 In many of these
60. Of the eight states with numerical share statutes, two, North Carolina and Ten-
nessee, have not adopted comparative negligence. Courts in both states adhere to the
language of their statutes and apportion tortfeasors' shares equally without regard to
fault. Ingram v. Smith, 16 N.C. App. 147, 191 S.E.2d 390 (1972); Terminal Transp. Co. v.
Clifford Co., 608 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn. App. 1980)(passim).
The purpose of the North Carolina statute is to enable litigants to determine in one
action all matters in controversy growing out of the same subject. Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C.
703, 705, 104 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1958); Read v. Young Roofing Co., 234 N.C. 273, 275, 66
S.E.2d 821, 822 (1951). Defendants equally at fault can sue for contribution when they
have paid more than their proportionate amount of the liability. Ingram v. Smith, 16
N.C. App. 147, 191 S.E.2d 390 (1972).
In Tennessee, the contribution statute is based on equal sharing, but one commentator
has suggested that relative fault be adopted. Wade, Crawford & Ryder, Comparative
Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and Future, 41 TENN. L. REv. 423, 461
(1973-1974). The authors suggested the following be adopted: "In determining the pro-rata
shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) considerations shall be given both to the
relative amount of fault of the parties and to the relative directness with which their
conduct contributed to the injury." The legislature and the courts in Tennessee have not
agreed with this proposal.
61. The 20 states are Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Some of these states are
discussed in the accompanying text, other are discussed in this footnote.
Louisiana originally recognized contribution in 1804. In 1979 the statute was amended
to read:
When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obligation arises
from a contract, a quasi-contract, an offense or a quasi-offense, the debt shall be
divided between them. If the obligation arises from a contract or a quasi-
contract, each debtor is liable for his virile portion. If the obligation arises from
an offense or quasi-offense, it shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's
fault.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2103 (West Supp. 1983). Virile portion means equal shares. See
Green v. Taca Int'l Airlines, 304 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974). See Carter v. Epsco Indus., Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 99 (M.D. La. 1980), for a discussion of the statute after the amendment.
Minnesota originally allowed contribution on an equal basis. MINN. STAT. § 548.19
(1980). See Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 505, 83 N.W.2d 252, 260 (1957). After Minne-
sota passed comparative negligence the court concluded contribution should also be
based on relative fault. See Tolbert v. Green Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977);
Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 302, 208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1973). Subsequently the
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states, the courts originally adopted fault-based contribution,
and the legislatures subsequently codified the judicial decisions.62
legislature permitted contribution based on relative fault. MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1980). See
Maday v. Yellow Taxi Co., 311 N.W.2d 849, 850 (Minn. 1981); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980).
Montana originally denied contribution among joint tortfeasors. See Variety Inc. v.
Hustad Corp., 145 Mont. 358, 368, 400 P.2d 408, 414 (1965). When comparative negligence
was adopted in 1975, contribution was permitted in any actions where comparative neg-
ligence was an issue. See Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Osier, 605 P.2d 1076,1078-81
(Mont. 1979). In 1981, a statute was passed allowing contribution in all actions where the
negligence of any party is an issue. The amount of contribution is proportional to the
negligence of the parties against whom recovery is allowed. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703
(1981).
The New Hampshire statute allows contribution on a relative-fault basis in conjunction
with comparative negligence. This statute, unlike the earlier Montana statute, permits
contribution in tort actions even when comparative negligence issues are absent. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507:7a-507:7b (Supp. 1979).
Texas originally passed a contribution statute in 1917 based on numerical determina-
tion of shares. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). This statute was amended in 1973
to provide for contribution in "proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to
each defendant." TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1982). See City of Austin v.
Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex. 1978). But where one defendant is strictly liable and
another is strictly liable or negligent, damages are apportioned equally. Relative-fault
contribution only exists when all the defendants are liable for negligence. General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855,862 (Tex. 1977).
Ohio adopted contribution in 1976, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31 (Page 1981); Oregon
adopted it in 1971, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.445 (1979). There are no cases in either state inter-
preting the relative-fault sections.
The Rhode Island legislature passed its statute in 1940, and subsequently amended it
in 1977 to permit relative-fault consideration. There are no cases interpeting the new
section. For an application of the Utah statute, see Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah
1981), in which apportionment of fault was determined to be 7091-30%.
Utah and Idaho each have comparative negligence statutes, but their contribution acts
emphasize the retention of joint and several liability. See Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100
Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979). Colorado passed its statute in 1977. It also retains joint
and several liability. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-103 (Supp. 1980).
In South Dakota, the only case interpreting the relative-fault provision is one in which
a claim for indemnity was pleaded. In a footnote, the court states apportionment of liabil-
ity among tortfeasors is allowable when there is disproportionate fault. Degen v. Bay-
man, 86 S.D. 598, 602 n.2, 200 N.W.2d 134, 136 n.2 (1972).
A federal court in Delaware, in one of the few cases interpreting the Delaware relative-
fault statute, stated that statute applies to intentional, as well as negligent tortfeasors.
McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1275 (D. Del. 1978). In McLean, the defendants
violated the federal security laws, and the court attempted to fashion an appropriate
remedy for the plaintiff.
According to the state supreme court, the Arkansas contribution statute originally
permitted judgment to be entered severally based on fault. Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725,
727, 212 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1948). However, the legislature later amended the statute to
protect a plaintiff's right to recover the entire judgment from any one of the defendants.
Contribution, though, is still based on fault principles.
62. In Illinois, for example, the state legislature enacted a contribution statute shortly
after the Illinois Supreme Court approved the rule in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Pack-
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In other instances, the legislature acted first.63 Almost all of
these twenty states recognize relative-fault contribution as a
more equitable rule than equal-share contribution.
The major controversy and discussion in these states has cen-
tered around the practical application of relative fault. Critics of
the rule have argued that it is judicially unmanageable, that it
involves great administrative expense and judicial time, and
that it depends upon standards which are difficult to apply.64 The
courts in those states which have adopted fault-based contribu-
tion acts have had to address these practical problems. In doing
so, they have sometimes interpreted their respective statutes in
different ways. 65
In Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich,66 the Wyoming Supreme Court
discussed the difficulty of determining percentages of fault under
the state's contribution act.67 At issue was whether the jury
should apportion the negligence attributable to multiple defend-
ants for the plaintiffs death in an auto accident. The court
refused to allow apportionment, stating that any such attempt
could not rationally be made and would result in jury specula-
tion and conjecture. 68 While recognizing that the Wyoming con-
tribution statute would allow an apportionment of fault in a
separate action, the court stated its concern that such an appor-
tionment would be as difficult to achieve in a separate contribu-
tion action as it would be in the case at bar.69 The case high-
lighted the tension that existed between the Wyoming legislature,
age Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub
nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc., v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
63. Washington is an example of a jurisdiction in which the state legislature initially
adopted relative-fault contribution. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Washington statute.
64. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 334-35, 579 P.2d 441, 447-48,146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 556-57 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring); See also American Motorcycle Ass'n
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 608, 578 P.2d 899, 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 201 (1978)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
65. The 1939 Uniform Act provides that relative degrees of fault are only to be con-
sidered when there is disproportionate fault so as to render equal shares inequitable. See
supra note 20. Many of the states now enacting relative-fault statutes do adopt the lan-
guage of the 1939 Act. However,there is no practical difference between the statutes pat-
terned after the 1939 Act and those that are not.
66. 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978).
67. WYo. STAT.§ 1-1-111 (1977).
68. 580 P.2d 1123,1131 (Wyo. 1978).
69. Id.
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which believed relative-fault contribution is workable, and the
Wyoming Supreme Court, which viewed fault-based contribution
as arbitrary and difficult to apply.70
Washington, like Wyoming, has a relative-fault contribution
statute towards which the judiciary has shown little enthusiasm.71
Washington enacted its contribution statute in 1981, three years
after the state supreme court had expressly declined to overrule
the state's no-contribution rule. In Wenatchee Wenoka Growers
Association v. Krack Corp.72 the Washington Supreme Court
was asked to adopt fault-based contribution in recognition of the
recent legislative adoption of comparative negligence. Warning
that application of a relative-fault contribution theory was loaded
with difficulty, the court stated: "many courts first considering
the issues surrounding contribution focus solely upon the prohi-
bitions theoretical underpinnings, rather than its practical com-
plications. '' 73 The Washington legislature disregarded Wenatchee.
Despite the court's warning, it passed a relative-fault statute.
In Florida, New York, and Illinois, it was the judiciary that
favored and initially adopted relative-fault contribution. Prior to
the adoption of relative fault, equal-share contribution existed in
New York and Florida.74 Illinois followed the traditional rule
against contribution. 75 By expressing displeasure with equal-
share contribution, the courts in New York and Florida influ-
enced their respective legislatures to amend the state statutes to
allow relative-fault determination. In Illinois, the supreme court
acted before the legislature.
The New York legislature amended its contribution statute to
permit relative-fault apportionment in 1974 after the New York
70. The Wyoming court in Todorovich pointed out, though, that a trial court can dis-
tribute shares equally if there is no disproportionate fault to render equal distribution
inequitable. Id. at 1131 n.3.
71. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.040-4.22.920 (1981). It provides in pertinent part:
"The basis for contribution among liable persons is the comparative fault of each such
person. However the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a
single person for purposes of contribution." Id. § 4.22.040(1).
72. 89 Wash. 2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978).
73. Id. at 852, 576 P.2d at 391.
74. See Zeglen v. Minkiewicz, 12 N.Y.2d 497, 191 N.E.2d 450, 240 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1963).
Florida had equal-share contribution for only one year before the change to relative fault
was made in 1976.
75. See Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382
(1973).
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Court of Appeals decided Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.76 The court
in Dole adopted a comparative indemnity system similar to the
one allowed in California.
Prior to Dole, New York, like many states, had permitted
indemnity between an actively negligent tortfeasor and a pas-
sively negligent tortfeasor. 77 This active-passive form of indem-
nity helped lessen the sometimes inequitable impact of equal-
share contribution by requiring an actively negligent tortfeasor
to shoulder the entire liability. In theory, a passively negligent
defendant was considered less culpable than one who was
actively negligent. This premise provided the justification for
shifting the entire burden to the one defendant who was more at
fault.78 As a practical matter, however, the active-passive ap-
proach allowed courts to make comparative judgments as to the
degree of fault of each tortfeasor and enabled them to make a
limited use of fault apportionment through indemnity.
New York courts became increasingly dissatisfied with the
active-passive approach because it provided inadequate protec-
tion against the inequities of the no-contribution rule and because
it was highly artificial.79 The comparative indemnity system
adopted in Dole allowed partial shifting of liability based on rela-
tive responsibility, with due regard to the particular facts of each
case.80 Although comparative indemnity did not affect the con-
tribution statute directly, its adoption did provide guidance for
the New York legislature. The legislature subsequently
76. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). The statute was changedto read: "No person shall be required to contribute an amount greater than his equitable
share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance with the relative culpabil-
ity of each person liable for contribution." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 1402 (McKinney 1976).
77. See Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192 N.E.2d 167, 242
N.Y.S.2d 210 (1963).
78. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147-51, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-93, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 386-89 (1972).
79. Active and passive negligence became merely conclusory labels. In practice, when
the factual disparity of fault between two tortfeasors was great enough that it would be
inequitable to divide the damages equally, the court simply labeled the less culpable
party as passively negligent and the more culpable party actively negligent. When the
equity of the situation demanded it, these labels were used to allow indemnity. See Putvin
v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691,186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
80. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In
another case, the New York Court of Appeals stated a fault apportionment rule is prag-
matically sound and realistically fair. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25,
29, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972). Unlike the Wyoming and Washing-
ton courts, the New York court believed not only in the essential fairness of comparative
fault, but also in its practical application.
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amended its statute to permit relative-fault contribution in order
to accurately reflect the new indemnity rule.8'
The Florida legislature also changed its contribution act in
response to a clearly expressed judicial preference for a com-
parative-fault standard.82 In Lincenberg v. Issen,8 3 the Florida
Supreme Court followed the state contribution statute which
provided for equal sharing, but added, "the most equitable result
that can ever be reached by a court is the equation of liability
with fault." 84 Comparing contribution and comparative negli-
gence, the court saw no sound justification for refusing to appor-
tion fault among defendants when Florida permitted such appor-
tionment between plaintiffs and defendants.85 The court con-
cluded that if fault determination were manageable in a compara-
tive negligence setting, then it ought also to work in the contri-
bution context.8 6 In a concurring opinion, one justice suggested
that the "principles of equity" section in Florida's equal-share
statute could be interpreted to permit relative-fault apportion-
ment.8 7 If this theory were accepted, then it would not have been
necessary for the legislative to change the contribution statute.
81. Under the new contribution statute, equitable apportionment is not limited to neg-
ligence actions. It is also applicable to cases with strictly liable defendants. See Doundou-
lakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1977).
82. The relative-fault section of the contribution statute now reads:
In determining the pro rata share of tortfeasors in the entire liability:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability.
(b) If equity requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a
single share.
(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 763.31(3) (West Supp. 1982).
83. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975). In this case, two defendants were held responsible for
the plaintiff's injury in an auto accident. The jury apportioned the damages between
them at 85%-15%. A question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court regarding
whether such apportionment of liability was proper. During the pendency of this appeal,
the Florida legislature passed the initial contribution statute not allowing relative
degrees of fault to be considered by courts.
84. Id. at 393.
85. Florida adopted comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973).
86. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
87. Id. at 394 (Boyd, J., concurring specially). Florida has a "principles of equity"
section in its statute like the one in the 1955 Revised Act. See supra note 82 for the text of
the Florida statute. The drafters of the Revised Act, however, did not permit trial courts
to use this section to apportion liability according to fault. See supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text. The concurring justice disagreed with the Revised Act drafters and
stated that "principles of equity" required the trial court to use its equity power to appor-
tion liability according to fault in all cases. The majority opinion had merely suggested
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In Illinois, it was the supreme court, not the legislature, that
first adopted relative-fault contribution. The contribution statute
enacted in 197988 was a codification of the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package
Machinery Co. 89 Prior to Skinner, Illinois followed the tradi-
tional no-contribution rule although, like New York, it did apply
the active-passive system of indemnity.90 Dissatisfaction with
the inequities of the no-contribution rule and the inadequacies of
the active-passive doctrine were the court's stated reasons for
changing Illinois law.91
In adopting relative-fault contribution, the court in Skinner
used a quantitative comparison. It focused on the extent to
which the fault of each of the two defendants proximately
caused the plaintiffs injury. The Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act, however, envisions a qualitative as well as
quantitative comparison. The use in the statute of the phrase
"relative culpability" suggests that both degrees of wrongdoing
and percentage of cause could be compared depending upon the
individual case.92
One state which uses a qualitative approach is Hawaii. The
that a trial court could do this if it felt it were equitable. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d
386, 393 (Fla. 1975). When the Florida legislature amended the contribution statute,
courts no longer had to interpret the "principles of equity" section in this manner because
relative fault was explicitly written into the statute.
88. An Act in Relation to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors P.A. 81-601, §§ 1-5,
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301-305 (1981). The relevant part of the statute provides:
Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be deter-
mined in accordance with his relative culpability. However no person shall be
required to contribute an amount greater than his pro rata share unless the
obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event,
the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable
obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability. If equity requires, the col-
lective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share.
Id. 303.
89. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978). See
also Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977) modified, 70 Ill. 2d 41
(1978); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977) modi-
fied, 70 111. 2d 47 (1978) (companion cases decided on the same day as Skinner).
90. See Reese v. Burlington & Quincy R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
91. 70 Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 442. The court stated, "governing equitable priciples
require that ultimate liability for plaintiffs injuries be apportioned on the basis of the
relative degree to which the defective product and the employer's conduct proximately
caused them." Id.
92. Appel & Michael, Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunity for
Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 169, 188-92 (1979).
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Hawaii Supreme Court has applied its relative-fault contribution
statute in a qualitative manner where the gross negligence of
one defendant is combined with the ordinary negligence of
another.93 A qualitative analysis looks to the nature and charac-
ter of the negligent act to determine the percentage of each
defendant's liability.94 The gross negligence/ordinary negligence
distinction is similar to the active-passive negligence doctrine
because it also attempts to alleviate the inequity of the no-
contribution rule where two or more defendants have degrees of
fault widely disparate.95 In the Hawaii case, though, the gross
negligence/ordinary negligence distinction was not used for this
purpose, but was used as a tool to allocate the liability of each
defendant. 96
The twenty states that have enacted relative-fault contribution
statutes share a common goal: to totally eliminate the inequity of
the no-contribution rule. Initially, some of these states were hes-
itant to adopt relative fault, primarily because of criticisms that
it was unmanageable, impractical and infeasible. Ultimately,
each of these states concluded that the inequity of no-contri-
bution or equal-share contribution outweighed the potential prob-
lems of determining relative fault. None of these states have
encountered serious problems with their statutes and the clear
trend in contribution law is toward relative fault.97
Statutes Not Specifying the Type of Shares
Eleven states presently have contribution statutes that do not
specify how shares of liability are to be apportioned among mul-
tiple tortfeasors.98 For the most part, these statutes allow contri-
93. Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Hawaii 128, 141-43, 363 P.2d 969, 978 (1961). A ratio of 65%
to 35% was approved by the court. In some states when one tortfeasor is grossly negligent
and the other is guilty of ordinary negligence, the grossly negligent defendant is pre-
cluded from recovering contribution at all. An example is Wisconsin. The distinction is
normally used to cure situations in which equal sharing would be inequitable.
94. Id.
95. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
96. In this same Hawaii case, the court also explained the role of an appellate court
when reviewing a finding of fault percentages. The appellate court should inquire into
whether the apportionment was so clearly erroneous as to shock the conscience. 45
Hawaii at 143, 363 P.2d at 978 (1961).
97. See supra note 14.
98. The 11 states are Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia.
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bution but leave to the courts the decision of whether to use
relative-fault shares or numerical shares. 99 Of these eleven states,
seven apportion shares equally, two permit relative fault, and
two are undecided. 100
Most of the states in this group enacted their statutes at a time
when contribution was fairly new. Equal sharing was presumed
Oklahoma only recently enacted a statute in 1978. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West
Supp. 1981-1982). There are no cases interpreting how liability is determined. Oklahoma
has adopted comparative negligence, though, which may be an indication of how the
statute will be interpreted.
The Nevada statute has a section stating that "principles of equity applicable to con-
tribution generally apply." NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.295 (1979). However, the Nevada courts,
unlike Florida's, have not addressed whether this section allows relative fault to be
considered.
The Virginia statute simply states: "Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced
when the wrong results from negligence and involves no moral turpitude." VA. CODE
§ 8.01-34 (1977). The statute was interpreted to provide that each tortfeasor is liable for
an equal amount. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 196 S.E.2d 75
(1973).
The West Virginia statute provides in its entirety:
Where a judgment is entered in an action ex delicto against several persons
jointly, and satisfaction of such judgment is made by any one or more of such
persons, the others shall be liable to contribution [sic] to the same extent as if
the judgment were upon an action ex contractu.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1981). Thus, in West Virginia, contract law governs whether and
to what extent contribution in tort shall be made. See Hutcherson v. Slate, 105 W. Va.
184, 142 S.E. 444 (1928).
See Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 228 A.2d 65 (1967), for an application of the New
Jersey statute. The shares were divided equally, but the court invoked the statute's collec-
tive liability section to decrease the net share of a master and servant. The court stated
that the whole field of contribution is based on equitable considerations. Id. at 80, 228
A.2d at 73.
In Pennsylvania, contribution is based on equitable principles, but the state supreme
court has decided that equal shares satisfy any equity requirements. Swartz v. Sunder-
land, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961). However, Pennsylvania has now adopted compar-
ative negligence. PA. CONS. STAT ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1982). One federal
court has viewed this development as a sign the contribution act has been impliedly
overruled to permit comparative fault determination between defendants as well. Slaugh-
ter v. Penn. X-Ray Corp., 638 F.2d 639,644 (3d Cir. 1981).
In Maryland, the legislature intentionally left undefined the phrase "pro rata shares."
Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 616-17, 398 A.2d 490, 512 (1979)
(rev'd on other grounds). Except for the absence of the relative fault provision, the Mary-
land statute is patterned after the 1939 Uniform Act. It was recently argued that the
absence of this provision can only mean that shares are to be determined equally, with-
out regard to fault. The Maryland Supreme Court agreed and refused to permit fault
apportionment. Id. at 615-19, 398 A.2d at 510-14. See also Early Settlers Ins. Co. v.
Schweid, 221 A.2d 920 (D.C. 1966).
99. A good example is the Virginia contribution statute. See supra note 98.
100. The seven states dividing shares equally are Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Virginia. Kentucky and Missouri permit
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to be the most acceptable method of apportioning fault, and that
is generally how the courts have interpreted and continue to
interpret these older statutes. Only Missouri and Kentucky courts
decided otherwise, and even they did so hesitantly. The Missouri
Supreme Court recently reevaluated its contribution statute and
adopted a form of comparative indemnity.10 1 Its contribution
statute, first adopted in 1855, had been interpreted to provide for
equal shares. 10 2
Kentucky also allows relative fault, but in a unique manner.
The Kentucky courts have not attempted to reevaluate their con-
tribution statute,10 3 which, like Missouri's, has been interpreted
to require equal sharing.10 4 Instead, a different statute, which
permits the apportionment of liability among defendants accord-
ing to comparative fault in trespass actions, has been applied
where possible. 05 The statute permits courts to enter judgment
severally, rather than jointly.106 In addition the Kentucky courts
have applied this statute to all types of tort actions, not simply to
trespass actions.'0 7 The statute only applies, however, where
joint defendants are sued by a plaintiff; third-party defendants
cannot take advantage of the statute.'08
Georgia is more representative of the states in this group.
Although it has a trespass statute similar to Kentucky's, Georgia
allows several apportionment according to comparative fault
only in trespass to property actions. 0 9 The state's contribution
statute is silent with respect to tortfeasor shares, but the state
courts have interpreted it to require equal shares."0
relative fault, and Oklahoma and Nevada are undecided.
101. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978). The type
of comparative indemnity adopted in Missouri is very similar to the kind in New York
and California.
102. Mulderig v. St. Louis, K.C. & C.R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 655, 672, 94 S.W. 801, 807
(1906).
103. Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1972). The text of this statute is the same as the Vir-
ginia statute. See supra note 98.
104. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16(1932).
105. Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.040 (1972).
106. Id.
107. Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Elpers v. Kimbel, 366
S.W.2d 157,161 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963). Cf. Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. Ct. App.
1976).
108. Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1976).
109. Jones v. Hutchins, 131 Ga. App. 808, 207 S.E.2d 224 (1974); Gamble v. Reeves
Transp. Co., 126 Ga. App. 161,190 S.E.2d 95 (1972).
110. Craven v. Allen, 118 Ga. App. 462, 164 S.E.2d 358(1968).
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New Mexico also has resisted the opportunity to reevaluate
contribution in light of modern principles of fairness. According
to the New Mexico Supreme Court, "equality is equity" and jus-
tice is best served by not comparing degrees of negligence or
fault 1 1 Significantly, the same court also has described contri-
bution as a concept deeply rooted in principles of equity, fair
play and justice.1" 2 Apparently, the New Mexico Supreme Court
does not consider relative fault to be the most equitable, just or
fairest form of contribution.
Judicially-Mandated Contribution
Five states and the District of Columbia permit contribution
among tortfeasors, or an equivalent form of recovery, by means
of judicial decision only."13 These decisions not only are influen-
tial in their respective jurisdictions, but also are respected in
states with contribution statutes. In many jurisdictions the tradi-
tional no-contribution rule was initially changed by the courts,
not the legislature. Because the no-contribution rule was judi-
cially created, the courts in these states, as in others, concluded
that they might properly alter judicial doctrine without waiting
for the legislature to act." 4
111. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Western Farm Bureau Ins. Cos., 93 N.M.
507, 508, 601 P.2d 1203, 1204 (1979) (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 310).
112. Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 70, 618 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1980).
113. The five states are Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska and Wisconsin. Nebraska
abolished the no-contribution rule in 1975. Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975). The Nebraska Supreme Court stated, "a right to
equitable contribution ... becomes enforceable... when [a tortfeasor] discharges more
than his proportionate share of the judgment." Id. at 764, 229 N.W.2d at 190. The court
did not explain whether a proportionate share should be determined numerically or by
relative fault.
Kansas has adopted a form of comparative implied indemnity among tortfeasors.
Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980). Kansas does not have a
contribution statute, but it has adopted comparative negligence. Kansas adopted com-
parative negligence in Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978). In Kennedy the
Kansas Supreme Court extended fault liability to joint tortfeasors similar to the kind
adopted in California and New York. Comparative implied indemnity is also recognized
at federal common law. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). In
federal admiralty law, the equally-divided damages rule has been replaced by relative
fault. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
114. See, e.g., Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374
N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 193 Neb. 752, 764, 229 N.W.2d 183, 189-90 (1975).
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When the courts of Iowa and the District of Columbia changed
from a traditional no-contribution rule to a rule allowing contri-
bution based on equal shares, both courts specifically stated that
contribution was an equitable doctrine.115 In Best v. Yerkes," 6 the
Iowa Supreme Court discussed the historical background of the
traditional rule before concluding that the no-contribution rule
should not apply to negligent tortfeasors who inadvertently
cause an injury. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also
based its decision on its authority to modify judicial doc-
trine. 1 7 Because the law in the District of Columbia does not
recognize degrees of negligence, contribution is based on equal
shares."18
Maine and Wisconsin adopted contribution among tortfeasors
relatively early." 9 As in Iowa and the District of Columbia, the
Maine and Wisconsin courts originally identified contribution as
an equitable right founded upon principles of natural justice. 20
Although equal shares was the initial method of apportionment
accepted in each state, courts in both states now have adopted
relative fault.' 21
In 1968, Maine passed a comparative negligence statute which
laid the groundwork for judicial change to fault-based contribu-
tion.122 The Maine Supreme Court adopted fault-based contribu-
115. George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Con-
stantine v. Scheidel, 249 Iowa 953, 90 N.W.2d 10 (1958); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77
N.W.2d 23 (1956).
116. 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956). The court distinguished negligent tortfeasors
from intentional wrongdoers, finding that the policy behind the common law is inappli-
cable to merely negligent defendants. Id. at 805-10, 77 N.W.2d at 26-29.
117. George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
118. Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C. 1966).
119. Maine adopted a form of contribution in Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815
(1918). Wisconsin adopted it in Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048
(1918).
120. See Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 451,104 A. 815, 816(1918).
121. Maine recognized relative-fault contribution in Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169
(Me. 1971). Wisconsin adopted it in Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
122. The statute in pertinent part provides:
In a case involving multi-party defendants, each defendant shall be jointly and
severally liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages.
However, any defendant shall have the right through the use of special inter-
rogatories to request of the jury the percentage of fault contributed by each
defendant.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980). The Maine Supreme Court interpreted the second
sentence of this part of the statute as having the sole purpose of laying the basis for
comparative contribution. Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169, 180 (Me. 1971).
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tion in Packard v. Whitten, 23 stating that the original adoption
of equal-share-based contribution "was only a step toward a
truly just distribution of responsibility."'124 The court saw no
great difficulty in applying the new rule, based on five years
experience in apportioning causal fault under comparative negli-
gence.125
In Bielski v. Schulze, 126 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached
a similar conclusion. Both contribution and comparative negli-
gence had existed in Wisconsin since the early 1900's, yet until
Bielski, in 1962, contribution was only permitted on an equal
basis.127 Bielski directly addressed the issue of whether numeri-
cal or relative-fault distribution is more equitable.12 8 The trial
court apportioned fault between the defendants at ninety-five
percent to five percent. In finding relative fault the more equit-
able system, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that there is no
justification in making the tortfeasor five percent at fault bear
fifty percent of the total burden. 129 Logic and justice required
that each tortfeasor be responsible only for the part of plaintiffs
injury he caused. The court also stressed that the use of special
verdicts makes practical application of fault-based contribution
possible, as already evidenced by their use in comparative negli-
gence actions.130
123. 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971).
124. Id. at 180.
125. Id. The court also emphasized that the use of devices such as special verdicts,
jury interrogatories, and cross-claims would all aid the jury in dealing with fault issues.
It stated that the fairness associated with comparative fault outweighs any increased
difficulties that might be encountered by the new rule and concluded that the judicial
system has the appropriate resources to handle any new problems. Id.
126. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
127. See Ellis v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
128. The court posed the issue in the following manner.
The crux of the question is whether the present automatic method of determin-
ing the number of equal shares between the number of joint tort-feasors
involved is as equitable and as just a determination of contribution as deter-
mining the amount of the shares in proportion to the percentage of causal neg-
ligence attributable to each tort-feasor.
Bielski, 16 Wis. 2d at 7, 114 N.W.2d at 108 (1962).
129. Id. at 9, 114 N.W.2d at 109.
130. Id. at 12, 114 N.W.2d at 110. Wisconsin was one of the states which used a gross
negligence/ordinary negligence distinction in order to alleviate the inequity which could
result from equal-share contribution. Since liability was to be based completely on fault
principles, the gross negligence doctrine was abolished by the Bielski case. Id. at 14-18,
114 N.W.2d at 111-14. Under the new rule, a grossly negligent tortfeasor can obtain a
partial recovery for the part of the plaintiff's injury he did not cause. Wisconsin also
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ANALYSIS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH SYSTEM
There is a clear trend in contribution law towards adopting
relative-fault contribution, as illustrated by the large percentage
of recently enacted contribution statutes and the increased
acceptance of comparative negligence.' 31 Although the principle
that tort liability ought to be based on fault is not new,132 there
is, however, debate as to whether fault principles are appropriate
in the context of contribution.
Theoretically, the principle that a wrongdoer should pay for
the damages he causes by his actions is difficult to dispute. If the
fairest and most just result is a court's ultimate goal, then the
distribution of liability should be in proportion to the degree of
negligence or fault of the various parties, except in rare circum-
stances. 133 However, courts must deal with practical realities as
well in order to administer justice in the most equitable and effi-
cient manner possible. Doubt concerning the manageability of
relative-fault contribution is thus a proper and appropriate judi-
cial concern.
The inequities of the traditional, no-contribution rule have led
ninety percent of American jurisdictions to modify this rule.
Initially, many states modified the rule by allowing contribution
in equal shares. Equal sharing was a substantial improvement.
Not only was it more equitable, it could be applied simply, con-
sistently, and with predictability. The total amount of damages
was simply divided by the number of defendants.
The only issues to decide were whether the individual defend-
ants were liable to the plaintiff and, if so, whether equity required
that two or more tortfeasors be treated as one tortfeasor for pur-
abolished the active-passive negligence doctrine because it does not strictly conform to
fault-based principles. Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d
383, 202 N.W.2d 268 (1972). A passively negligent tortfeasor remains slightly at fault and
ought to contribute for the portion of the injury he caused.
131. Of the 45 jurisdictions surveyed in this note, 28 permit contribution or indemnity
on a relative fault basis, 14 allow contribution on the basis of equal shares, and 3 have
yet to decide which of the two to follow. Of the 19 contribution statutes passed or
amended since 1970, 15 specifically state that each tortfeasor's share is based on relative
fault.
132. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 75, at 492-94. Many of the states discussed in this
article were hesitant not only to adopt relative-fault contribution, but also to adopt con-
tribution at all.
133. See W. PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 61-66 (Thomas M. Cooley
Lectures No. 4, 1953).
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poses of apportioning damages. Courts and juries did not inquire
into degrees or nuances of fault. Once a defendant was found
liable, he was responsible for a numerical proportion of the
judgment, either to the plaintiff or to his co-tortfeasors by way of
contribution.
But an equal-share rule also can be inequitable in many
instances, just as the no-contribution rule can be. A tortfeasor
who is five percent at fault should not in fairness be required to
pay fifty percent of the judgment. Being liable for one-half of the
burden is not as unfair as imposing 100 percent of the liability
on him, but it certainly does not fairly measure his responsibility
for the plaintiffs injury. The flexibility required to insure fair-
ness in all cases is lacking under the equal-share rule. Although
simple and practical, it is often only a partial cure for the no-
contribution rule. States that apply the active-passive negligence
doctrine are attempting to remedy the possible inequities of
equal-share contribution, but that is not enough. That doctrine is
too artificial. It is applied to remedy outrageous results and does
not insure fairness in the vast majority of cases.
On the other hand, relative-fault contribution completely reme-
dies the traditional no-contribution rule. It permits flexibility,
unlike the rigidity of equal shares, and apportions liability in the
fairest manner possible. Each defendant is responsible only for
the portion of the plaintiffs injury he caused. The plaintiffs
right to recover the entire judgment is protected by retaining
joint and several liability.
The primary criticism of relative-fault contribution, though,
centers on its practical application in the judicial system. Critics
argue that there are no standards of measurement that courts
can use to determine percentages of fault. 34 Other criticism
focuses on the additional time and money that must be spent
under a relative-fault system.
Yet the successful application of comparative negligence and
relative-fault contribution in the states adopting either of them
shows that fault apportionment is possible. The judicial system
is equipped with a number of devices to facilitate fault compari-
134. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 334-35, 579 P.2d 441, 447-48,
146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556-57 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring). The concurring justice asserted
"Blind inquiry into relative fault is no better than the flip of a coin, and disputes over
degrees of fault must greatly increase the time and cost of litigation." Id. at 335, 579 P.2d
at 448, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 557
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son. Jury interrogatories, severance of claims, and special ver-
dicts are examples. The only additional issue the court must
decide under a relative-fault system is the degree of the defend-
ant's liability. In order for relative-fault contribution to be effec-
tively applied, fault percentages need not be computed to the pre-
cise percentage. Apportionment to the nearest five or ten percent
is adequate. Juries are capable of such computations and should
be allowed the flexibility to apportion liability in the most equit-
able manner.
CONCLUSION
The trend towards relative-fault contribution is a good one.
Contribution based on relative fault is more equitable than equal
sharing and is workable within the judicial system. Although
equal sharing partially eliminates the inequities of the tradi-
tional rule, relative fault provides a much fairer and more equit-
able method of apportioning liability among multiple defend-
ants. The experiences of the states that have adopted either
comparative negligence or relative-fault contribution prove com-
parisons of fault can be made in a fair and efficient manner.
DONALD A. SMITH
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